UIC School of Law

UIC Law Open Access Repository
UIC Law Open Access Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2008

An Empirical Economic Analysis of the 2005 Bankruptcy Reforms,
24 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 327 (2008)
Thomas Evans
Paul B. Lewis
John Marshall Law School, plewis8@uic.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/facpubs
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Thomas Evans & Paul Lewis, An Empirical Economic Analysis of the 2005 Bankruptcy Reforms, 24 Emory
Bankr. Dev. J. 327 (2008)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/facpubs/420
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC Law Open Access Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access
Repository. For more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

AN EMPIRICAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE 2005
BANKRUPTCY REFORMS
Thomas Evans*
Paul B. Lewis**

INTRODUCTION

The Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (the "Act")1
was signed into law on April 20, 2005, and took effect on October 20, 2005.
The Act represents the most significant change in personal bankruptcy law
since the Bankruptcy Code's (the "Code") enactment in 1978.
The Act passed into law following a period of time in which bankruptcy
filing rates were increasing, 2 despite low unemployment, low interest rates, and
generally increasing economic prosperity.3 Among the stated goals of the Act
4
was to limit access to bankruptcy relief, in part, to ferret out and limit abuse.
The Act generated a large amount of commentary, both from academia and
the popular press. Much of the commentary has focused on the addition of the

Department of Policy Analysis and Management, Comell University.
J.D., Yale Law School. Professor of Law, and Director, Center for International Business and Trade
Law, The John Marshall Law School. I thank Christina Demakopoulous, Reid Heiligman, and Kathy Wantuch
for their invaluable research assistance.
1 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat, 23
(2005).
2 For example, consumer bankruptcies rose from approximately 300,000 in 1985 to roughly 1,450,000
in 2006. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Statistics, available at www.uscourts.gov/bnkrptcystats/
bankruptcystats.htm. To illustrate the magnitude of the problem in the United States, Professor Elizabeth
Warren wrote in a 2004 article,
*

This year, more people will end up bankrupt than will suffer a heart attack. More adults will file
for bankruptcy than will be diagnosed with cancer. More people will file for bankruptcy than
will graduate from college. And, in an era when traditionalists decry the demise of the institution
of marriage, Americans will file more petitions for bankruptcy than for divorce.
Elizabeth Warren, The New Economics of the American Family, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 1, 27 (2004).
3 See J. Kumar, R. Mason & D. Ralston, Consumer Bankruptcies: Causes and Implicationsfor the
Credit Industry, 17 ECON. PAPERS, Sept. 1988, 18, 22.

4 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S1814 (statement of Sen. Frist) (contending that bankruptcy has become a
primary option and "is no longer a last resort.... Those who have the means should repay their debts").
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5
so-called "means test" to be eligible for relief under chapter 7 of the Code.
Many have decried the means test, designed to limit access to chapter 7

bankruptcy for debtors of a certain financial stature, as unfairly altering the
balance between debtors and creditors in that it could potentially deny

bankruptcy relief to a sizable number of individuals. 6 Others have argued that
the means test is 7 an appropriate method to deal with certain perceived

bankruptcy abuses.

This Article makes three contributions to the debate. First, in Section I, we
describe the two primary bankruptcy routes for which consumer debtors may
opt: chapter 7 or chapter 13.

We include both the major advantages and

disadvantages of the respective choices and the primary changes in bankruptcy
law stemming from the Act. Second, in Section II, we present empirical
evidence of the effect of the Act on both the number of personal bankruptcies,
and on the relative fraction of chapter 7 and chapter 13 filings. The goals of
the Act were to reduce the total number of bankruptcies, and to reduce

especially the incidence of chapter 7 declarations. Using separately gathered
national level, state level, and micro-data from the United States Bankruptcy

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, we find that the Act was causal in
reducing the total number of personal bankruptcies by approximately 200,000
per quarter (a reduction of approximately 40%), and in reducing the fraction of
chapter 7 bankruptcies from 0.7 to 0.6. Third, in Section III, we provide a

discussion of the meaning of the fresh start, and put the Act in both historical
and international perspective.

5 For a discussion of the debates surrounding the Act's lengthy enactment process, see Susan Jensen, A
Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM.
BANKR. L.J.485 (2005).
6 See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Increasing Uniformity in Consumer Bankruptcy: Means Testing as a
Distractionand the National Bankruptcy Commission's ProposalsAs A Starting Point, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 1 (1998); Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Taking the New Consumer Bankruptcy Modelfor
a Test Drive: Means-Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 27 (1999); Charles Jordan
Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States?, 18 BANKR. DEV. J.1 (2001).
7 See, e.g., Edith H. Jones and Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L. REV. 177.
Senator Charles Grassley stated in Congress that "It's not fair to permit people who can repay to skip out on
their debts." 146 CONG. REc. S5384 (2000) (remarks of Sen. Grassley).
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I.

OVERVIEW OF PRE-ACT BANKRUPTCY LAW AND THE MAJOR
AMENDMENTS

The Code 8 provides for two primary forms of consumer bankruptcy
proceedings. The first, known as chapter 7, has in recent years been the
overwhelmingly favored option among debtors. 9 The other is known as
chapter 13. The preference for chapter 7 rather than chapter 13 among debtors,
and the accompanying ability of chapter 7 debtors on average to discharge far
greater amounts of debt than their chapter 13 counterparts, was in large part the
motivating force for bankruptcy reform in the United States.
Chapter 7 is designed to provide debtors with a simple and relatively
inexpensive method of obtaining a bankruptcy discharge. In chapter 7, debtors
may obtain a discharge of prepetition debts without incurring future debt
payment obligations as long as they relinquish all non-exempt assets owned at
the time of bankruptcy for distribution to creditors. Chapter 7 debtors need not
pay creditors out of future income.
The amount of available exemptions is, thus, very significant for chapter 7
debtors and their creditors. Debtors may generally opt for either the Code's
exemptions' 0 or for those of their state of domicile. The exemption amounts
vary greatly, both across states, and between those available under the Code
and those available under individual state law. Most notably, the homestead
exemption under existing bankruptcy law has been $15,000."1 By contrast,
those debtors opting for the exemptions available in their state may have a
homestead exemption ranging from nothing to the unlimited homestead
exemption long available in Texas and Florida. 2
Under chapter 13 to obtain a discharge, a debtor must repay a portion of his
or her indebtedness from future earnings over what historically had been a
standard three-year period. These payments are made pursuant to a courtapproved plan. Unlike a chapter 7 debtor, a debtor in chapter 13 is not
8 The Bankruptcy Code is found at Title 11 of the United States Code. All Code citations herein are

thus to I I U.S.C.A. § 522 (West 2007).
9 For example, for the 2004 calendar year, the year preceding the enactment of the Act, 1,137,958
Americans filed chapter 7 bankruptcy petitions while 449,129 Americans filed in chapter 13. Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/bnkrpctystatsbankruptcystats.htm (last visited Apr. 6,
2008).
10 The bankruptcy exemptions are found in II U.S.C.A. § 522 (West 2007).
'
II U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(1) (West 2007).
12 FLA. CONST. an. 10, § 4; TEx. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 50, 51.
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required to relinquish any non-exempt assets. Rather, payment is made out of
postpetition assets, including future earnings, acquired during the duration of
the plan. In the event that a trustee or an unsecured creditor objects to
confirmation of the debtor's proposed payout plan, the plan must conform to
the projected disposable income requirement. This requirement mandates that
the plan provide for the debtor's entire projected disposable income for the life
of the plan be applied to creditor payments under the plan. The projected
disposable income calculation requires a projection of how much the debtor
will earn over the plan period and a deduction from that amount of expenses
that are reasonably necessary for support of the debtor and3 his or her
dependants. The resulting amount must be used to fund the plan.'
As an incentive to choose chapter 13 rather than chapter 7, chapter 13
debtors receive what is often referred to as a "super-discharge." Section 523 of
the Code provides for numerous types of debt that are non-dischargeable in a
chapter 7 proceeding. Of the eighteen non-dischargeable debts under pre-2005
law, all but three had historically been dischargable in chapter 13.14
The treatment of secured claims in chapter 13 is noteworthy. Chapter 13
provides two methods by which debtors may deal with an accelerated secured
loan. Under the first, known as modification under pre-Act law, if a secured
creditor refused to accept a proposed plan and if the debtor refused to
voluntarily surrender the encumbered collateral, a plan could still be confirmed
so long as it provided for repayment of an amount, as of the effective date of
the plan, that is at least equal to the amount of the allowed secured claim.15 If
the collateral is worth less than the outstanding debt, the value of the secured
claim-and thus the amount of payment-is based on the collateral value, not
the debt value. This was the so-called "cramdown" effect of chapter 13. Thus,
a chapter 13 debtor could, over the objection of the secured creditor,
effectively redeem the collateral by paying off its value in installments over the
life of the plan.
The second principle method of treating secured claims in chapter 13 is
reinstatement and cure. Unlike modification, this is a return to the initial terms
of the loan. The default is deemed cured, and the loan is deemed reinstated.
13 See generally § 1325(b).
14 The three which may have not been dischargeable in chapter 13 are debts arising from maintenance
and child support obligations, those stemming from educational loans, and those debts resulting from death or
personal injury caused by an individual operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Id. § 1328(a)(2).
'5 Id. § 1325(a)(5)(B).
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When this happens, the debtor assumes two obligations. First, any obligation
that is overdue must be cured within a reasonable time; and second, any
obligation that has not yet become due remains payable on the original due
date. Reinstatement and cure tends to be used more frequently than
and cure may be used
modification because unlike modification, reinstatement
6
residence.'
primary
debtor's
a
by
secured
debt
for
There tend to be a number of factors why individuals choose chapter 13
over chapter 7. Among the most compelling factors are the existence of
substantial non-exempt property that would be liquidated in a chapter 7 but
which may be retained in chapter 13,17 and the possibility of discharging
certain debts in chapter 13 which cannot be discharged in chapter 7.18
Alternatively, the debtor may believe that chapter 13 involves less
stigmatization or may result in a lesser impact on the debtor's credit rating.
Nationally, the Act's goals-to reduce consumer filings and to alter the
percentage of chapter 13 filings relative to chapter 7 filings-appear to have
initially succeeded. Consumer filings dropped following the Act's enactment
from roughly 1.5 million per year over the past few years to an annualized rate
of approximately 800,000.19 In addition, the percentage of debtors filing under
chapter 13 has initially increased. z
By moving more debtors into chapter 13, the amount of debt repayment
creditors can expect to receive when their debtors enter bankruptcy will likely
rise. This result comes from two directions. First, chapter 13 debtors on
2
average repay their creditors significantly more than do chapter 7 debtors. 1
Second, and perhaps more importantly, while virtually all individuals who file
under chapter 7 receive a discharge, roughly only one-third of debtors who file
in chapter 13 successfully complete the required payment schedule and obtain

16 Id. § 1322(b)(5).
17 The clearest example of this is when applicable exemption law places dollar limits on the value of the
exemption of the home.
18 Many non-dischargeable debts in chapter 7 may be discharged in chapter 13. Id. § 523(a) (nondischargeable debts) and § 1328(a)(2) (indicating that most debts included in § 523(a) are dischargeable in
chapter 13).
19 See chart I and accompanying citations.
20 Following the 2005 amendments, roughly forty percent of debtors have filed under chapter 13. The
pre-Act percentage was approximately 27.5. Id.
21 Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS:
BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 44 (1999).
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a discharge.22 Thus, roughly two-thirds of chapter 13 debtors obtain little or no
relief from their creditors by virtue of the bankruptcy laws. The Act's attempt
to accomplish its goals comes largely through an expansion of the definition of
when a chapter 7 filing constitutes an abuse of the bankruptcy process. The
new standard used to determine chapter 7 eligibility is commonly referred to as
the "means test."
Under the Act, when a debtor whose income is greater than the median
income for his or her state of residence 23 files a case in chapter 7, the
24
bankruptcy trustee, the court, or any other party in interest may bring a
25
motion to dismiss a chapter 7 filing for abuse under § 707(b) of the Code. In
such an occurrence, the "means test ' 26 will be employed to determine whether
the debtor may remain in chapter 7, whether his or her case will be dismissed,
or, with the consent of the debtor, whether the case will be transferred to one
under chapter 13. Under the means test, abuse of the bankruptcy process will
be presumed 27 if the debtor's current monthly income, 28 less payments on
expenses,29
secured and priority debt divided by sixty, minus allowed personal
30
exceeds one of the Code's two trigger points. If the debtor will have at least
$6575 over five years, abuse is presumed if that income is sufficient to pay at
least twenty-five percent of the debtor's general unsecured debt over a fiveyear period. 3 1 Additionally, if the debtor will have at least $10,950 over five
22

TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, Who Uses Chapter13?,

in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 269, 273 (Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen, lain Ramsay &
William C. Whitford eds., 2003).
23 For an example of when the means test would be triggered, for cases filed in Illinois after February 1,
2007, the median income for a one-person household is $42,995, for a two-person household it is $54,599, for
a three-person household it is $64,184, and for a four-person household it is $74,705. See Department of
Justice, U.S. Trustee Program, Census Bureau Median Family Income By Family Size,http://www.usdoj.gov/
ust/eo/bapcpa/20070201/bci data/medianincome table.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
24 II U.S.C.A. §707(b)(1).
25 If a debtor's income falls below the state median, a bankruptcy court may still find abuse, but the
creditors do not have the standing to file such a motion. Id. § 707(b)(6).
26 Id. § 707(b)(2).
27 The presumption may be rebutted only by a demonstration of "special circumstances that justify

additional expenses or adjustments of current monthly income." Id. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i).

28 Current monthly income is defined as the debtor's average monthly income over the six months
preceding filing. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 (10A).
29 The allowed personal expenses are determined based on Internal Revenue Service guidelines which
establish appropriate levels of expenses based on family size for such things as food, clothing, personal care,
transportation and housing. See Internal Revenue Service, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/O,,id=
104627,00.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
30 Under the Act, abuse warranting dismissal or conversion may also be found by a judge based on the
totality of the circumstances, including bad faith in filing. 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(3).
31 Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i).
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years, abuse is presumed irrespective of the amount of general unsecured debt
that the debtor has incurred.32

As noted, the means test has been highly controversial. It has been
criticized, among other things, for being essentially unnecessary in that most
debtors will easily satisfy its requirements, 33 for distracting from more pressing
issues,34 for expending vast amounts in the way of resources for little, if any
gain, 35 for failing to force consumer lenders to better monitor their own
behavior, for
failing to address the underlying causes of consumer
bankruptcy, 36 and for being fundamentally unfair.

32 Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii); see also Richard I. Aaron, Access to Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy, 2006 UTAH
L. REV. 925, 939-43 (explaining the application of the means test more fully).
In addition, the Act makes other changes designed to impact the choice between chapter 7 and chapter
13. For example, the Act also potentially alters the duration of certain chapter 13 plans. If the chapter 13
debtor's income is greater than the state median income, the plan proposed must be for five, rather than three
years. In addition, the Act limits the chapter 13 super-discharge so that a number of debts previously
dischargeable in chapter 13, but not in chapter 7, will no longer be dischargeable in chapter 13. These include
debts incurred by fraud or by false statements, by failing to schedule debts, by defalcation while acting as a
fiduciary and for debts arising from orders to make criminal or civil restitution.
33 See Culhane & White, supra note 6, at 31 (arguing that only 3.6% of chapter 7 debtors in their study
could possibly repay a meaningful portion of their debt); see also Gordon Bennett & Ed Flynn, Income, Debts,
and Repayment Capacities of Recently Discharged Chapter 7 Debtors, Executive Office for United States
Trustees (Jan. 1999), available at http://www.abiworld.org/Iegis/reformi/eoust-99janhtml.
34 See Braucher, supra note 6.
35 See Culhane & White, supra note 6, at 61; see also Elizabeth Warren, A Principled Approach to
Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L. J. 483, 506 (1997).
36 In the United States, significant problems underlying the rise in bankruptcies include the following.
For 2005, the last year available at the time of this writing, the number of uninsured Americans was 43.3
million. See Center for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics, Health
Insurance Coverage, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/hinsure.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2008). The official
poverty rate was 12.6% of the population. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Income Climbs, Poverty
Stabilizes, Uninsured Rate Increases (Aug. 29, 2006), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/
releases/archives/incomewealth/007419.html. The number of people unemployed as of July 2007 was
approximately 7,100,000, or 4.6% of the population. Employment Situation: July 2007, http://www.bls.gov/
news.release/History/empsitO08032007.txt (last visited June 20, 2008). Divorces continue to grow in number.
See U.S. Census Bureau, Vital Statistics, Table 72, http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/06statab/vitstat.pdf
(last visited Apr. 6, 2008). Being a single parent is one of best indicators that an individual will file for
bankruptcy. In fact, in the United States, a home with children is more than three times as likely to file for
bankruptcy as a home without. Warren, supra note 2, at I. In 2001, for example, unmarried women with
children filed 21.3 bankruptcies per thousand, compared to 14.7 per thousand for married families with
children, 7.2 per thousand for childless women, and 6.1 per thousand per childless man. Id. at 26 n.79. If
current trends continue, by the year 2010, one in seven children in the United States would live in a home
where bankruptcy has been declared. Id. at 1. The result, according to this argument, is that even if we had a
flawless bankruptcy system, the problems giving rise to the indebtedness that leads to bankruptcy would be
unaffected.
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The second change brought by the Act that has received significant
academic and public attention was the change made to the application of the
homestead exemption under bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy law-uniform in all
other respects-contains a significant anomaly in regard to the homestead
exemption. Although the Code provides for a set of exemptions, debtors in
most instances may opt to substitute these federally-determined standards with
the exemption laws of their state of residence. As there is a great variance in
regard to the extent which individual states allow the home to be exemptedranging from no exemption in Delaware and New Jersey to the unlimited
homestead exemptions of Texas and Florida-this aspect of bankruptcy law
was ripe for abuse. The Act addresses this by allowing debtors to elect their
state exemptions only if they have lived in that state for 730 days prior to the
date of filing for bankruptcy. 37 If they have moved during that 730-day period,
the state exemptions are those for the state in which they lived the majority of
38
the time for the 180 days prior to the running of the 730-day period.
Significantly, irrespective of the level that state exemption law affords, under
the Act debtors may exempt only up to $136,875 of interest in a homestead
that was acquired within the 1,215-day period prior to the filing, but the
calculation of that amount does not include any equity that has been rolled over
39 In
during that period from one house to another within the same state.
addition, to the extent the homestead was obtained through fraudulent
conversion of non-exempt assets during the ten-year period before the filing,
40
Not
the exemption is reduced by the amount attributed to the fraud.
surprisingly, the decision for the Act to address possible homestead exemption
abuses came in part in response to the large number of incidents in recent years
of high profile debtors involved in such things as corporate scandals, securities
laws violations, and fiduciary fraud. Thus, finally, the Act provides that in no
circumstances may a debtor exempt an amount in excess of $136,875 if the
debtor has been convicted of a felony under circumstances that demonstrate
that the filing of a bankruptcy case was an abuse of the provisions of the Code
or if the debtor owes a debt arising from violations of securities laws or fraud
in either a fiduciary capacity or in connection with the sales or purchases of
securities. 4 1

I1I U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(3) (West 2007).
Id. § 522(b)(3)(A).
39 Id. § 5 2 2 (p).
40 Id. § 522(o).
41 Id. § 522(q). An exception to this limitation exists when a court determines that the property is
reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and his or her dependents. Id. § 522(q)(2).
38
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A third category of changes that has generated significant commentary is
the changes that have been made as to how the Act treats domestic support
obligations. There had been significant concern that by enhancing the position
of numerous creditors, by such things as making more credit card debt
nondischargeable and giving automobile financers additional rights, the Act
would serve to reduce the status of former spouses and their children. As a
result of these concerns, Congress responded with a panoply of changes to aid
domestic support obligations. To begin with, the Act creates a new definition
of what constitutes a domestic support obligation. Section 101(14A) defines
domestic support obligations to include not only debts in the nature of alimony,
maintenance, and support to a spouse, former spouse, or child, but also those
owed to a governmental unit.42 More substantively, the Act does the
following:
"

The Act gives a first priority to debts arising from maintenance
and child support obligations, with the sole exception that
administrative costs of a trustee are paid ahead of the support costs
to the extent that the trustee
is administering assets that can be
43
used to pay support costs.

*

The automatic stay does not apply to the payment of a
maintenance and support obligation from property that is not
property of the estate or to the enforcement of a wage withholding
order under a judicial or administrative order, or statute, including
44
obligations accruing both before and after the bankruptcy filing.

*

Failure to remain current on support claims is now grounds for
conversion or dismissal of a case.45

"

And finally, the debtor must be current on postpetition
maintenance and support obligations in order to confirm a chapter
13 plan.46

In addition, under the Act nobody may become a debtor in bankruptcy
unless, within 180 days prior to filing for bankruptcy, he or she has received
credit counseling from an "approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling
42 Id. § 101(14A).
41 Id. § 507(a)(1).
44 Id. § 362(b)(2).
41 Id. § 1307(c)(I11).
46 Id. § 1325(a)(8).
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agency. '47 The law provides an exception when there is an emergency and the
debtor could not receive counseling within five days, or if the United States
Trustee determines that the approved agencies cannot adequately provide the
48
If, as part of such counseling, a
required counseling in the particular case.
debt management plan is developed, it must be filed with the bankruptcy
49

court.

In addition, the Act makes significant changes in the valuation of personal
property securing a lien. Section 506(a)(2), a new provision created in 2005,
requires that the value of personal property securing a claim in the case of an
individual in chapter 7 will always be based on the cost of the debtor replacing
the property, without deduction for costs of sale or marketing, and that if the
property was acquired for personal, family, or household purposes, this
replacement cost will be the retail price for property of similar age and
condition. 50 A related provision will make it appreciably more difficult for
debtors to retain automobiles. Under the Act, a debtor who wishes to use the
traditional cramdown provision of § 1325(a)(5)(B) to retain a car when the
debt is undersecured will now be required to pay off the full amount of the
debt-not just the value of the collateral-in cases where the creditor holds a
security interest 5in a motor vehicle purchased within 910 days of the
1
bankruptcy filing.
Extensive new document production requirements have been added by the
Act. Under the Act, unless the court orders otherwise, debtors must file, along
with their schedules of assets and liabilities, such newly required documents as
a statement of itemized monthly net income and an indication of an
the next twelve months.Z
anticipated increase in income or expenditures over
For the first time, the Act imposes an obligation on debtors to provide recent,
relevant tax returns.53 The failure to provide these additional documents
within forty-five days after the filing of a bankruptcy petition results in
automatic dismissal of the case. 54 These increased reporting requirements will
not only make the administration of the case more efficient, they will also
Id. § 109(h).
Id. § 109(h)(2).
Id. § 521(b).
Id. § 506(a)(2).
Id. § 1325(a).
Id. § 521(a)(1)(B).
Id. §§ 521(e)(2)(A), 521(f)(1)-(3). These must be produced not later than seven days before the initial
postfiling meeting of creditors.
54 Id. § 521(i).
41
41
49
50
51
52
13
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likely adversely affect many potential debtors, whose record-keeping and
documentation may be sufficiently disorganized to prevent compliance with
these requirements and thus, pursuant to these provisions, prevent them from
obtaining bankruptcy relief.
The Act may also have a chilling effect on the number of attorneys willing
to represent debtors, because the Act for the first time imposes meaningful
obligations and sanctions for certain attorney conduct. Most notably, the Act
requires attorneys to make "reasonable inquiry to verify that the information
contained" in petitions and schedules are correct.55 By signing the bankruptcy
petition, an attorney verifies that he or she has engaged in such inquiry and has
no viable reason to suspect that any such information submitted to the court is
incorrect. 56 In addition, pursuant to § 707(b)(4), if a trustee's motion to
dismiss or convert a chapter 11 case pursuant to the means test is granted, the
attorney may have personal liability in that he or she may be required to
reimburse the trustee for costs and may also be obligated to pay a civil
penalty. 57 These rules serve to effectively make attorneys guarantors of the
information supplied by debtors. The passage of the Act was thus thought to
potentially bring about a decrease in the number of attorneys willing to
represent debtors, to result in higher attorneys' fees for those willing to
continue to represent consumer debtors, or both.
Finally, the Act enacted a number of changes that confronted the issues of
serial and abusive filing. First, the Act adds meaningful limitations on the
ability of debtors to file successive chapter 13 cases. Under the Act, a chapter
13 debtor will be denied discharge if a chapter 7 or chapter 11 discharge had
been received within four years of the new filing, or if a chapter 13 discharge
was granted within two years of the filing. 58 There had previously been no
such limitation on chapter 13 filings. This results in the elimination of socalled "Chapter 20s," whereby debtors would first file in chapter 7 to discharge
what unsecured debts they could, then immediately file a chapter 13 to deal
with secured claims. In addition, the ban on successive chapter 7 filings was
extended from six to eight years. 59 The ramifications of these limitations make
the post-bankruptcy debtor a likely target for certain lenders. The debtor has
discharged most or all of his or her debt, increasing the likelihood that the
55 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011.
56 See II U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(4)(A), (B), (D); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011.
57 I1 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(4).
58 Id. § 1328(0.

'9 Id. § 727(a)(8).
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creditor will be repaid. And if the debtor cannot repay the creditor, bankruptcy
relief is not an option for the recently discharged debtor.
The Act's direct ramifications on debtors are to make bankruptcy filing a
more expensive prospect. This follows from at least three causes. First, due in
part to increased court time stemming from the implementation of the means

test, more bankruptcy judges were appointed. 60 The cost of adding new
members of the judiciary has been covered in large part by raising the filing
fees for debtors. 61 Second, the advent of mandatory credit counseling
necessitates additional costs for the debtor, an amount on average of roughly
an additional $50 per filing.62 And third, with new potential liability for
attorneys, the prospect that attorneys will charge more to offset these risks is
certainly evident.
II.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF THE ACT

More than two years have passed since the Act was passed and

implemented.

With the passage of time it is now possible to obtain some

preliminary empirical estimates of the effects of the Act on the number and

composition of bankruptcies.

The forthcoming analysis will focus on two

specific objectives of the Act: first, to reduce the number of bankruptcies; and
second, to encourage a larger percentage of debtors to select relief under

chapter 13 rather than chapter 7. Reasons to expect that the number of
bankruptcies will decrease include alterations to home exemptions laws, a
reduced list of super-discharge items, higher filing fees, costly mandatory
60 The Act authorized the creation of twenty-eight new judges. While it was widely expected that there
would be an immediate, significant surge of bankruptcy filings before the Act's implementation-and there
was, more than 600,000 cases were filed in the sixteen days before the Act became effective-it is clear that
ongoing costs of the Act will be even more significant. A preliminary analysis indicates that the staffing
requirements for bankruptcy courts have grown ten percent as a result of the Act, and "the duties of bankruptcy
administrators have increased enormously as a result of the Act." THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U. S.
COURTS, REP. ON THE IMPACT OF THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF
2005 ON THE WORKLOAD OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY FOR THE U.S. H. AND S. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS 5
(August 2006).
61 For example, in 1986, the filing fee for cases commenced under both chapter 7 and chapter 13 was
raised from $60 to $90. In 1988, it was raised to $120. In 1992, a $30 "noticing fee" was added to each
chapter 7 and chapter 13 filing. In 1993, the filing fee was raised to $130, so that debtors had to pay, with the
noticing fee, $160. In 1999, the fee for chapter 7 cases rose to $200, with the fee for chapter 13 cases rising to
$185. Finally, as of April 9, 2006, fees for chapter 7 cases reached $299, with fees for chapter 13 cases at
$274. U.S. Bankruptcy Court Fees, http://www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/fees.html (last visited Apr. 6,
2008).
62 See Kathleen Day, Bankruptcy's New Era, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2006, at DI.
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credit counseling, higher attorney fees, and limits on multiple bankruptcy
filings. The primary reason to expect that a larger fraction of debtors will
select chapter 13 rather than chapter 7 is the newly-adopted median income
means test. However, the increase in the duration of many chapter 13 plans
from three to five years for those above the median income threshold, and the
reduction in super-discharge items may serve to mitigate some of the expected
increase in the number of chapter 13 filers.
The following three subsections present empirical analysis of three distinct
data sets. The first data set consists of bankruptcy statistics drawn nationally.
Using the national-level data it will be possible to compare the broad trends in
the total number of bankruptcy filings as well as in the composition of chapter
7 versus chapter 13 bankruptcies, both before and after the Act's
implementation.
The second data set consists of state-level quarterly
bankruptcy statistics. By merging the state bankruptcy statistics with statelevel unemployment, income per capita, and mass layoff statistics, it is
possible to obtain a more nuanced understanding of the Act's effects.
Specifically, it will be possible to isolate the Act's effects from those of
unrelated economic events, the trend in bankruptcy filings across states, and
the relatively different effects of the Act across states. However, despite the
usefulness of the big-picture gross number of bankruptcies at the national and
state levels, there is necessarily a loss of detail with macro data sets. In an
attempt to obtain greater understanding of the issues that affect the bankruptcy
decision, an original data set of individual debtors' filings has been constructed
from the subset of debtors filing for bankruptcy in the Northern District of
Illinois both in the year preceding and in the year following the Act's
implementation. With micro-level data it will be possible to control for
individual characteristics of debtors in order to gauge the Act's effects on the
bankruptcy decision.
A. Empirical Analysis of National-Level Data
Chart I presents aggregate chapter 7 and chapter 13 bankruptcies for the
entire United States between December 1995 and December 2006.63 The Act
was passed during the second quarter of 2005 and implemented during the
fourth quarter of the same year.

63 U.S. Courts Bankruptcy Statistics, Table F-2, Business and Non-Business Cases Commenced, By
Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the Three Month Period Ended.... available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/bnkrpctystats/statistics.htm.
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Table 1 - U.S. Chapter 7 and 13 Bankruptcies
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Some basic observations regarding the bankruptcy patterns are in order.
During the latter half of the 1990s it appears that the number of bankruptcies
first increased and then decreased slightly. Beginning in the fourth quarter of
2000 there is a sharp and sustainable increase in the number of bankruptcies.
The pattern of bankruptcies between 1995 and 2005 can generally be explained
in terms of the overall U.S. economy: the United States was experiencing
sustained growth during the 1990s, and then experienced a mild recession
beginning in 2001.
It seems reasonable to conclude that the unprecedented variation in the
number of bankruptcies, beginning in June of 2005 and lasting through the
second quarter of 2006, is the result of the Act. The Act was enacted during
the second quarter of 2005, after which the number of bankruptcies increased
relatively quickly until the implementation of the Act during the fourth quarter
of 2005. After the Act's implementation there is an immediate drop in the
number of bankruptcies. During the last three quarters of 2006 the number of
bankruptcies stabilized at a new lower level. The observed pattern could be
explained by a rush to declare bankruptcy during the period of time between
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the Act's adoption and implementation. After the Act's implementation there
are fewer bankruptcies for two reasons: first, the Act has made it more costly
to declare bankruptcy; second, a large number of people who would have
declared bankruptcy during early 2006 behaved strategically and declared
bankruptcy prior to the Act's implementation.
Straightforward regression analysis was employed to determine whether the
pattern of bankruptcies represents a significant change. Due to the large
variation immediately surrounding the Act's passage and adoption, the data
from the third and fourth quarters of 2005 and the first quarter of 2006 are not
included in the analysis. The quarterly number of bankruptcies is regressed on
interest rates, the long-term trend in bankruptcies, and an Act fixed dummy
variable. The regression analysis indicates that the Act reduced the number of
quarterly bankruptcies by 234,000 and that the drop is statistically significant
at the 1% level. 64
Chart 2 presents the chapter 7 share of chapter 7 and chapter 13 quarterly
bankruptcies for the nation. The average chapter 7 share of bankruptcies was
71% between the fourth quarter of 1995 and the fourth quarter of 2004.
Following the Act's passage in the second quarter of 2005, the chapter 7 share
of bankruptcies begins to increase. The chapter 7 share reaches its all time
high of 86% during the third quarter of 2005, just as the Act took effect.
Immediately after the Act's implementation during the fourth quarter of 2005,
there was an unprecedented drop in the chapter 7 share of bankruptcies.
During the last three quarters of 2006 the average chapter 7 share of
bankruptcies were 57%.65 The overall pattern in the chapter 7 share of
bankruptcies is similar to that of the total number of bankruptcies mentioned
previously. It seems as if debtors were acting strategically by declaring
chapter 7 bankruptcy before the more restrictive rules under the Act took
effect. A regression of the share of chapter 7 bankruptcies on interest rates, a
long-term trend, and an Act-fixed effect indicates that implementation of the
Act resulted in a 14% drop in the chapter 7 share of bankruptcies, and that the
drop is statistically significant at 1% level.

64 If the data from the third and forth quarters of 2005 and the first quarter of 2006 are included in the
regression analysis it is estimated that the Act reduced quarterly bankruptcies by 341,000. Furthermore, if a
trend variable is included in the analysis it is estimated that the number of quarterly bankruptcies increases by
over 7000 per year (and that the trend is statistically significant). There is no statistically significant effect of
changes in the prime-lending rate on the number of bankruptcy declarations.
65 While the first quarter of 2006 was omitted from this analysis to guard against a temporary anomalous
change, had the figures for this quarter been included, the resulting statistical change would be nominal.
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Table 2- Chapter 7 Share of Personal Bankruptcies
U.S. Quarterly Data
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B. EmpiricalAnalysis of State-Level Data

Quarterly state-level bankruptcy data, between the fourth quarter of 1995
and the fourth quarter of 2006, was obtained for all fifty states. 6 The
bankruptcy data was merged with state-level unemployment levels, income per
capita, population, and state layoffs. 67

Table 1 presents various regressions using the dataset that estimate the
effect of the Act on the total number of personal bankruptcies and the effect of
the Act on the share of chapter 7 bankruptcies.

66 U.S. Courts Bankruptcy Statistics, Table F-2, Business and Non-Business Cases Commenced, By
Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the Three Month Period Ended..., available at http://www.uscourts.
org/bnkrpctystats/statistic.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
67 See generally Economagic, http://www.economagic.com (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
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Table 1
State Level Quarterly Data
Total Quarterly Bankruptcies
(3)
(2)
(1)
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R
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In regressions 1 through 3 the goal is to estimate the effect of the Act on the
total number of quarterly bankruptcies. Regression 1 presents the results of a
regression of the total number of state quarterly bankruptcies on a Pre-Post
Bankruptcy Indicator and a yearly trend variable. The Pre-Post Bankruptcy
Indicator is equal to zero for all periods prior to the Act's implementation and
is equal to zero for all periods after the implementation. The coefficient of
-3356 on the Pre-Post Bankruptcy Indicator indicates that the Act decreased
the average number of bankruptcies by 3356 per state per quarter (a drop of
approximately 167,000 per quarter nationally). The bankruptcy coefficient is
statistically significant at the 1% level.68 The coefficient on the yearly trend

68 Robust standard errors are presented under each coefficient.
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indicates that the average number of bankruptcies per state has been growing at
a rate of 262 per state per year, or 13,100 per year nationally. The yearly trend
is statistically significant. Part of the motivation for passing the Act was the
long run increase in the number of bankruptcies. The positive and significant
yearly trend indicator confirms that the number of bankruptcies had been
increasing over the long term.
In regression 2, a richer set of control variables are included in the analysis.
The state rate of unemployment, income per capita, population, and any mass
state layoff episodes are all included. The coefficient on the Pre-Post
Bankruptcy Indicator indicates that the average number of bankruptcies per
state dropped by 3281 after the Act's implementation (164,000 per quarter
nationally); the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level. The
magnitude and signs of the coefficients on the other included variables are
reasonable. That is, a 1% increase in the rate of unemployment increases the
average number of state bankruptcies by 320 per quarter per state; a $1000
increase in income per capita decreases the number of bankruptcies by 133;
states with larger populations have a larger number of bankruptcies; and state
layoffs increase the number of bankruptcies. The reasonable signs and
magnitudes of the coefficients on these included variables provide reassurance
that the regression analysis is operating as desired.
In regression 3, fifty state indicator variables are added to the analysis.69
The state indicator variables help to capture omitted state characteristics that
may affect bankruptcy filings. For example, they may capture different levels
of bankruptcy stigma or homestead exemptions across states. The coefficient
on the Pre-Post Bankruptcy Indicator in regression 3 indicates that the number
of quarterly state bankruptcies decreased by 3555 as a result of the Act's
passage (178,000 per quarter nationally); the coefficient is statistically
significant at the 1% level. One complication with including the state indicator
variables is that they take up much of the variation in variables that are
relatively stable across time, which explains why the coefficients on income
per capita and population change so much between regressions 2 and 3.
However, for the purposes of analyzing the effects of the Act on the number of
bankruptcies per quarter, it is reassuring that the Pre-Post Bankruptcy Indicator
is relatively stable across regressions 1 through 3. The inclusion of the various
combinations of explanatory variables had a relatively minor impact on the
69 The econometric terminology for the state indicator variables is state dummy variables or state fixed
effects.
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estimates of the effect of the Act on the number of bankruptcies (the quarterly
range was from -3555 to -3281 per month, or a decrease of between 164,000
and 178,000 nationally).
In regressions 4 through 6, the objective is to estimate the effect of the Act
on the chapter 7 share of total bankruptcies. In all three regressions the chapter
7 share of monthly bankruptcies in each state is regressed on various
explanatory variables. The Pre-Post Bankruptcy Indicator is used to estimate
the effect of the Act on the share of chapter 7 bankruptcies. The Pre-Post
Bankruptcy Indicator is equal to zero prior to the Act's implementation and
The estimated coefficient on the Pre-Post Bankruptcy
one afterwards.
Indicator is the estimated effect of the Act on the share of chapter 7
regressions.
In regression 4 only an intercept trend variable, and the Pre-Post
Bankruptcy Indicator are included. Regression 5 employs the full set of
explanatory variables. Regression 6 includes the state indicator variables in
addition to the full set of explanatory variables.
Across regressions 4 through 6 the coefficient on the Pre-Post Bankruptcy
Indicator ranges from -7.9 to -8.3 percentage points, and is always statistically
significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, the drop in the chapter 7 share of
bankruptcies reverses a trend where the share had been increasing by 0.3
percentage points per year between 1995 and 2006, as indicated by the yearly
trend variable. The stability of the estimates across regressions 4, 5, and 6
(despite the large differences in the included control variables) is reassuring,
and indicates that the Act was causal in reducing the chapter 7 share of
bankruptcies by approximately eight percentage points.
C. EmpiricalAnalysis of Monthly Datafrom the United States Bankruptcy
Courtfor the Northern Districtof Illinois
In an attempt to further refine the estimates of the effect of the Act on
bankruptcy filings, an original micro-level dataset has been constructed.
Random samples of 200 observations per month were selected from the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois bankruptcy filings.
The data extend back to October 2004, one year prior to the Act's
implementation, and includes every month through December 2006, one year
after the Act's implementation. The data gathered includes: the date the
bankruptcy petition was filed, whether chapter 7 or chapter 13 was selected,
the marital status of the debtor, the number of dependants, whether there was a
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joint filing, the debtor's sex, the debtor's total assets, the debtor's total
liabilities, the total amount of both unsecured and secured debt, the value of all
real property owned by the debtor, the amount of the debtor's personal
property, and the debtor's monthly income.
Table 2 contains the summary statistics for the dataset. The Chapter 7
Indicator is equal to zero if the debtor declared chapter 13 bankruptcy and one
if the debtor opted for chapter 7; a mean of 0.68 indicates that 68% of the
bankruptcies in the full statistical sample were chapter 7 debtors. Similarly,
the Married Indicator is equal to one if the bankrupt was married and zero
otherwise; 33% of bankrupts were married. The Female Indicator is equal to
one if the bankrupt was female, and zero otherwise; 48% of the bankrupts in
the sample were female. The average number of dependants was 1.1, and the
range was zero to sixteen. On average, 12% of bankruptcy filings involve a
joint filing. The average total combined monthly income for bankrupts is
$2655, but the reported range is extremely large in the sample, ranging from a
low of $0 to a high of $395,404 per month. 70 The average total assets came to
$91,369, whereas the median total assets were $16,092. The value of mean
total assets is being driven by a relatively few outlying observations: the 1% to
99% range is $145 to $612,586. Similarly for total liabilities, the average is
$115,823 and the median is $61,138. The mean unsecured and secured debts
are $41,668 and $74,177, and the medians are $14,000 and $26,938.

70 The median monthly income is $2178, and the 1% to 99% range is $330 to $7956.
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Table 2
Summary of Statistical Monthly Data Obtained from the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois
Variable
Chapter 7 Indicator
Married Indicator
Female Indicator
# of Dependants
Joint Debtor Indicator
Total Income per Month
Total Assets
Total Liabilities
Unsecured Debt
Secured Debt

Mean
0.68
0.33
0.48
1.1
0.0002
2656
91369
115823
41668
74177

Std. Deviation
0.466
0.47
0.50
1.39
0.014
7510
147272
144605
58417
119797

Min
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Max
1
1
1
16
1
395404
2833068
3478627
1126358
2352267

In Table 3, regressions 7 and 8 estimate the effect of the Act on the chapter
7 share of total bankruptcies by regressing the chapter 7 share of bankruptcies
on various explanatory variables, including a Pre-Post Bankruptcy Indicator.
In regression 7 the coefficient on the Pre-Post Bankruptcy variable indicates
that the share of chapter 7 bankruptcies dropped by twenty percentage points
after the Act was enacted; the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1%
level. 71 In regression 8, the full set of explanatory variables is included. In
regression 8 it is estimated that the Act caused a 16 percentage point drop in
the chapter 7 share of total bankruptcies. There is quite a large difference in
the estimated effect of the Act on the drop in the chapter 7 share of
bankruptcies between the regressions presented in Table 1 and those just
presented in Table 3. We offer no certain explanation for the difference
between the two sets of results. One possibility, however, is that the
geographically small dataset from Northern Illinois is not representative of the
national-level data. Additionally, the Northern Illinois data covers only two
full years of data while the state- and national-level data cover more than a
decade.

71 Note that no trend variable has been included in any of the regressions presented in Table 3; due to the
relatively short two-year time frame under analysis a trend would not be an important variable.
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Table 3
Pacer Monthly Data
Chapter 7 Share of Total Personal Bankruptcies
(9)
(8)
(7)
Intercept

.78...
(.008)

.886'**
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Pre-Post Bankruptcy
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-.
20*
(.012)

-.158
(.012)

.73*..
(.006)

(10)
.82..
(.012)

Median Income Indicator

-.33
(.036)

-.21
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-.085'*
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-.002
(.002)
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-.001
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-.031"
(.017)

.002
(.016)
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.017
(.013)

.01
(.013)
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-.007*
(.023)

-.65
(.013)

Number of Dependants

-.018
(.005)

-.029***
(.005)

2

R
Observations

0.17
5158

The other coefficients of interest from regression 8 are as follows. First,
total monthly income had no statistically significant effect on whether debtors
chose chapter 7 or chapter 13, whereas total assets did, though the magnitude
of the effect of total assets is quite small.72 If a debtor is married it would drop
72 A $1000 increase in total assets will decrease the probability of selecting chapter 7 by 0.1 percentage
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his or her probability of selecting chapter 7 by three percentage points, and
being a joint debtor has a very small negative effect on the probability of
selecting chapter 7. As the number of dependants increases, the probability of
selecting chapter 7 decreases by 1.8 percentage points per dependant. Finally,
a debtor's sex has no statistically significant effect on whether a debtor selects
chapter 7 or chapter 13.
As noted previously, one of the major changes to the bankruptcy rules
contained in the Act was the introduction of the means test. Following the
Act's implementation, for a debtor to be eligible for chapter 7 bankruptcy
relief, a debtor had to have income below the state median. The objective of
regressions 9 and 10 is to attempt to determine whether the means test is causal
in the drop in the chapter 7 share of bankruptcies. By creating median income
indicators, it is possible to isolate the specific effect of the median income
means test on the share of chapter 7 bankruptcies. In regressions 9 and 10,
there are two median income indicators. The variable labeled Median Income
Indicator is equal to zero for all debtors with monthly incomes below the
Illinois median income level and is equal to one for all bankrupts with income
above the median income level. 73 The variable Post-Reform Median Income
Indicator is equal to one for all bankrupts above the median state median
income who filed for bankruptcy after the Act took effect, and zero otherwise.
Interpretation of these two coefficients should be as follows: the coefficient on
the Median Income Indicator is the difference in the probability of someone
above the median income filing for chapter 7 bankruptcy prior to the Act's
implementation relative to a person with below median income; and the Post
Reform Median Income Indicator is the difference in the probability of
someone with above median income filing for chapter 7 bankruptcy after the
Act's implementation relative to someone with above median income prior to
the bankruptcy. Accordingly, in regression 9, people with above median
income will have a 33% lower probability of filing chapter 7 bankruptcy prior
to the Act than people with below-median income. After the Act is
implemented, the probability of an above-median income person filing for
chapter 7 bankruptcy drops by an additional 8.5 percentage points. In
regression 10, where the full set of control variables are included, it is
estimated that prior to the Act, having above-median income reduced the
probability of filing for chapter 7 bankruptcy by 21%, and that after the Act's
73 For the period of analysis, the median income for a person with no dependants is $42,995, for a family
of two it is $54,599, for three it is $64,184, and for four people it is $74,705. For families in excess of four,
simply add an additional $6400 per dependant.
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implementation the probability of above-median income debtors selecting
chapter 7 dropped by an additional 15%.
At first pass the sign and magnitude of the Post Reform Median Income
Indicator could be taken to demonstrate that the median income means test is
causal in reducing the chapter 7 share of bankruptcies. There are two problems
with this conclusion, however. First, there are not nearly enough abovemedian income debtors to be driving the overall drop in the share of chapter 7
bankruptcies; in the statistical sample being analyzed, only 13% of debtors
have above-median income. Second, when people with income greater than
the median threshold are omitted from regressions 7 and 8, 74 it is estimated that
the share of chapter 7 debtors still drops by between 14% and 17%. This
indicates that something besides the means test is driving people to ,select
chapter 7 versus chapter 13.
III. DISCUSSION OF THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND THE MODEL OF RATIONAL
BANKRUPTCY

The Act was the first major change to U.S. consumer bankruptcy law since
the bankruptcy laws were completely re-written by the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 (the "1978 Act"). 75 The 1978 Act was instrumental in liberalizing
personal bankruptcy. Our reading of the empirical papers that investigated the
effects of the 1978 Act is that the 1978 Act was causal in increasing the
number of personal bankruptcies. For example, Lawrence Shepard estimates
that chapter 7 bankruptcies increased by 15% and chapter 13 bankruptcies
increased by 20% as a consequence of the 1978 Act.76 Additionally, William
Boyes and Roger Faith found that the 1978 Act increased the bankruptcy
77
filings rate and decreased the secured to unsecured debt ratio. According to
was the
Boyes and Faith the change in the secured to unsecured debt ratio
78
result of a shift in the ratio of responsible and irresponsible debtors.

74 Only debtors with below-median income are included, and so none of those debtors are subject to the
means test.
75 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
76 Lawrence Shepard, Personal Failures and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 27 J.L. & ECON. 419

(1984).
77 William J. Boyes & Roger L. Faith, Some Effects of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 29 J. L. &

ECON. 139 (1986).
78 id.
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One complication in using the 1978 Act to estimate the effect of changing
bankruptcy rules on the incidence of bankruptcy is that during the same time
frame in which the 1978 Act was enacted a number of significant changes in
the banking laws in the United States took place. Most notably, as a result of
the Supreme Court's ruling in Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v.
First of Omaha Service Corp.,7 9 borrowing and lending in America were
liberalized, and levels of consumer debt began to grow. Therefore, it is
difficult to separate the effects on the bankruptcy rates of the 1978 Act from
other economic factors such as increased consumer borrowing.
It is advantageous for purposes of analysis that 2005 was a relatively quiet
time with regards to major legislation that might impact personal bankruptcy.
A rational model of the bankruptcy decision would predict that more difficult
and costly bankruptcy proceedings would result in fewer bankruptcies. Our
findings indicate that the Act was in fact causal in reducing the number of
bankruptcies by approximately 200,000 per quarter. Furthermore, regulations
that attempted to reduce the number of chapter 7 filings relative to those of
chapter 13 by making chapter 7 less appealing, have also been successful.
In observing the pattern of quarterly bankruptcies in the period between the
Act's enactment and its implementation, it seems clear that the rational model
of bankruptcy has been in operation. How else to explain an increase in the
number of bankruptcies from roughly 400,000 per quarter prior to the Act's
passage in the first quarter of 2005, to 465,000 in the second quarter, 540,000
in the third, 665,000 in the fourth, and a drop to 115,000 the first quarter after
the Act's implementation? Macro variables such as unemployment rates,
interest rates, and others cannot explain the observed pattern. Similarly,
explanations stemming from unexpected financial distress will be left wanting;
there were no variations in economic outcomes during 2005 that even begin to
explain the wide swings in bankruptcy rates. The reasonable explanation is
that debtors were acting strategically by declaring bankruptcy under the more
favorable terms of the pre-Act rules.
The model of the rational bankrupt has not been universally accepted.
Other commentators have focused on a bankruptcy model based on the
frequency of instances of acute financial distress due to an improper lack of
social safety net.
For example, in separate articles, Teresa Sullivan,

"

439 U.S. 299 (1978).
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80
Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Westbrook as well as Susan Block-Lieb and
Edward Janger, 81 have argued that the leading cause of bankruptcies, as
explained by debtors themselves in survey questionnaires, is acute financial
distress stemming from such factors as job loss, divorce, or insurmountable
medical bills. 82 Following from this is the suggestion that, if indeed most
bankruptcies are caused by unexpected financial distress, then the validity of
the model of rational bankruptcy is called into question. But even if acute
financial distress is in fact the overwhelming cause of bankruptcy filings, it
83
does not follow that the rational bankruptcy model has been refuted.

Consider the following model of consumer borrowing and bankruptcy.
Assume that a person has income of $40,000 per year, but that there is some
probability that they will encounter an income shock during the coming year.
The shock could be positive or negative (for example, unexpected bonuses or
positive stock market performance would yield positive benefits, and injury or
layoff would yield negative shocks). Let us assume that the mean shock is
zero, the variance is $5000, and the distribution is normal.
The person must decide how much to save (or borrow). If interest rates are
high and bankruptcy relief is relatively difficult to obtain, then the person
would be rational to have high savings or borrow at a relatively low rate. In
this instance, even if a negative shock occurs, the person would very likely
have sufficient ability to borrow additional funds so that he or she would be
able to endure all but the most severe of economic shocks without declaring
bankruptcy. We consider this to be reflective of the pre-1978 period, prior to
the enactment of the 1978 Act and the liberalization of the banking sector that
occurred at approximately the same time.
If, however, credit is relatively cheap (that is, interest rates are low and the
cost of applying for additional credit is low) and bankruptcy relief is relatively
80 Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Less Stigma or More Financial
Distress: An EmpiricalAnalysis of the ExtraordinaryIncrease in Bankruptcy Filings, 59. STAN. L. REV. 213
(2006).
81 Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: Rationality,
Behavioralism, and the Misguided "Reform" of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1481 (2006).
82 But see Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, 99 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1463, 1502-24 (2005) (discussing why unemployment, divorce, and medical costs cannot fully explain
the rise in consumer bankruptcy filings).
83 In addition, one must certainly question the expected accuracy of self-reported reasons for declaring
bankruptcy. It appears entirely possible that debtors responding to surveys would not fully acknowledge
irresponsible behavior or poor planning on their part as being the primary cause of their need to seek
bankruptcy protection.
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easy to obtain, then the same person would be rational to save less (or to
borrow more). This would be the case even if the person's tolerance for risk,
for any potential bankruptcy stigma, and for the distribution of potential
income shocks was constant. By borrowing more, the person would be more
exposed to negative income shocks; it would take a smaller negative income
shock in this instance to push the person over the edge into bankruptcy. There
are two reasons for this. First, because bankruptcy relief is relatively easy to
obtain, there are fewer disincentives to enter bankruptcy. Second, because the
debtor has borrowed more money, it takes a smaller negative shock to push the
individual into bankruptcy. 84 The key point is that the person is identical in
both instances, and in both instances it is an unexpected negative income shock
that pushes the person to declare bankruptcy. When credit is cheap and
bankruptcy access is relatively easy, even a rational person will have
incentives to take greater risks. And by doing so, the individual increases his
or her likelihood of filing for bankruptcy.
Statistics bear out this hypothetical. Between the enactment of the 1978
Act and the 2005 Act, consumer credit increased dramatically, interest rates
were low, and bankruptcy access was generally easier than in either the pre1978 or the post-2005 periods. Not surprisingly, as obtaining credit became
easier and interest rates dropped, the rate of bankruptcy filings increased
accordingly. From the consumer perspective, this is not surprising. The big
question is why lenders continued to keep extending credit to people who
would have a difficult time repaying their loans.
With the adoption of the Act, interest rates and credit have remained
relatively low, but obtaining consumer bankruptcy relief has become more
difficult. The same fictitious person would be rational to cut back on his or her
level of borrowing, which will in turn reduce the probability that he or she will
ultimately file for bankruptcy relief. This is consistent with the conclusions
drawn from the empirical estimates contained herein.
Finally, even if people are miserable in bankruptcy, the rational model of
bankruptcy is not refuted. People take many risks in their daily lives, not least
of which is the morning automobile commute. Car accidents are one of the
leading causes of death in America, and when they occur they cause
unimaginable distress, and yet no one is suggesting that people are irrational to

84 If the income shocks are normally distributed then whereas there is a 1.5% change of a negative shock
of $10,000 or more, there is a 15% chance of a negative shock of $5000 or more.
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continue driving cars. A similar argument can be made regarding people's
behavior regarding personal debt and bankruptcy. People may well be rational
to take on debt to improve their current situation by paying for education and
medical bills. However, every time they do so they are increasing the odds
that another negative economic shock will push them into bankruptcy. The
bankruptcy may well cause serious distress, yet the person behaved rationally

to take the initial risk, and they may very well take a similar risk in the future.
How then to refute the rational model of bankruptcy? It will be refuted if

changes in constraints result in changes in behavior that goes against behavior
predicted by the rational model. For example, if bankruptcy rules are eased
and the rate of bankruptcy stays constant or decreases, ceteris paribus.

Similarly, if people do not reduce their borrowing when interest rates increase
or if expected negative shocks increase, the same resulting conclusion can be

drawn.
IV. THE 2005 ACT AND THE MEANING OF THE FRESH START

By exposing certain filers to the means test, limiting discharge, and raising

the cost of bankruptcy, the Act represents a fundamental change in the
philosophy which has underlined American bankruptcy law since the advent of
the first comprehensive Bankruptcy Act in 1898, namely, that debtors are
85
fundamentally honest but unfortunate, as opposed to potential abusers of the
86
Policy arguments in the U.S. have thus traditionally
bankruptcy process.

85 The concept of a fresh start for the honest but unlucky debtor is firmly rooted in Anglo-American
bankruptcy jurisprudence. As early as 1706, English Parliament passed a bankruptcy act which contained a
provision for the discharge of the debtor from pre-bankruptcy debts. See 4 Anne, ch. 17, § 7 (1705). The
United States Supreme Court stated in 1934 in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 244 (1934), that bankruptcy
"gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the
time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of preexisting debt." Clearly related to the fresh start concept is the decreased likelihood that
the debtor will ultimately become dependent upon public support.
86 Even the Act's name-the Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005-suggests that its
need is in part due to the fact that many debtors are abusing the bankruptcy process. As an interesting aside,
arguments have been made that only a fraction of those who would benefit from filing consumer bankruptcy
actually do so. See Michelle J. White, Why Don't More Households Filefor Bankruptcy, 14 J. L. ECON &

ORG. 205, 206 (1998) (arguing that while at least 15% of American households would benefit from
bankruptcy, only slightly more than 1% actually file). Elsewhere, Professor White contends that with some
pre-bankruptcy planning, more than 50% of American households would gain by filing, with the greatest gains
accruing to the wealthiest. Michelle J. White, Why it Pays to File for Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at
Incentives Under U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Laws and a Proposalfor Change, 65 U. CHtI. L. REV. 685, 706
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supported a broad fresh start for this honest but unfortunate debtor. Arguments
in favor of the broad fresh start-and thus in opposition to restricting open
access to bankruptcy via such instruments as the means test-are both
economic and moral. Historic economic justifications for the broad fresh start
include that discharge shifts the burden of overextensions of credit from
debtors to creditors, who are better able to bear these costs. This in turn helps

to promote the efficient allocation of losses. 87 The party who can best protect
himself or herself bears the greatest risk of loss. This argument assumes, of
course, that creditors are both better determiners of risk and better risk bearers
than
debtors. 88 loan
As determinations.
risks to creditors rise, the hope is that they will make
more are
conservative

The second major economic consideration involves the desire to promote
entrepreneurial activity. In America, consumer bankruptcy law has historically
been viewed as serving a market function. The use of credit and the taking of
rational entrepreneurial risk have traditionally been considered desirable, and
the presence of bankruptcy law serves to offset some of the associated risk.89
Thus, the breadth of the American fresh start has historically provided a social

safety net by creating a mandatory, immutable form of financial insurance.
Moral arguments in favor of a broad fresh start include that requiring
payment of future income comes too close to a violation of the involuntary
servitude provision of Thirteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and that models of consumer bankruptcy which mandate

repayment out of future income, such as those employed in Australia and the
United Kingdom, are based on historical and cultural factors that do not exist
in the United States, where bankruptcy is not seen exclusively as a mechanism

(1998); see also Scott Fay, Erik Hurst & Michelle White, The Household Bankruptcy Decision, 92 AM. ECON.
REV. 706, 712 (2002) (putting the percentage of households that would benefit from filing at about 18%).
87 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 953, 981 (1981); see
also Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEx. L. REV. 757, 764 (1975).
88 While there are arguments to the contrary, there is much to support this hypothesis.

For example,

compelling arguments exist that creditors can better evaluate risk since they do so on a regular basis, since they
can do so objectively, and that creditors may be able to insure against these losses by, among other things,
diversifying their portfolios and monitoring debt consumption. See Steven L. Harris, A Reply to Theodore
Eisenberg's Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 30 UCLA L. REV. 327, 362 (1982). Arguments to the contrary
include that borrowers have greater control of their financial affairs than do lenders and that borrowers can
better assess personal characteristics that could lead to bankruptcy. See Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 982-83.
For a broad discussion of behavioral issues in considering bankruptcy policy, see SAUL SCHWARTZ, Personal
Bankruptcy Law: A Behavioural Perspective, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra
note 22.
89 See H.R. DOC. No. 93-173, at 71-76 (1973).
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for creditor debt collection. 90 Further, it has been argued, a broad discharge
and fresh start are ethical and humane, and the fresh start provides the prospect

of the debtor again becoming a productive member of society. This latter
element will occur only if the debtor-rather than his or her creditors-will
realize the fruits of his or her prospective labor.9 1 A related argument is that
means testing tips the debtor-creditor balance in bankruptcy too heavily in

favor of creditors, thus harming families by requiring payment of general
unsecured debt that would otherwise be used to pay maintenance and child
support; finally, the argument has been made that the Act fails to address the

critical issues that have caused the vast increase in consumer bankruptcy
filings. 92

According to this last argument, the only way of meaningfully

addressing bankruptcy issues is by addressing broad social problems such as
rate, the lack of universal health insurance, and corporate
the high divorce
93
downsizing.

Arguments against the broad fresh start are also both economic and moral.

The central economic arguments against a broad fresh start-and
correspondingly in favor of the means test-include that the promise to repay
money is an important legal obligation, and that maintaining the sanctity of
contracts is an essential part of Anglo-American legal tradition. Accordingly,
the fresh start jeopardizes the sanctity and efficiency of contracts. The effect

of a broad fresh start is thus a liberal extension of an individual's ability to be
excused from a contract. This result may have economic ramifications,
resulting in increased uncertainty in the market, which in turn affects the
efficiency of the market.
A related argument is that in reality, the means test is merely a method of

forcing individuals to repay what they are capable of repaying, which is
desirable because the degree of bankruptcy relief available should align with

90 See Jacob S. Ziegel, The Philosophy and Design of Contemporary Consumer Bankruptcy Systems: A
Canada-UnitedStates Comparison, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 205, 244 (1999).
91 See Ellen E. Sward, Resolving Conflicts Between Bankruptcy Law and the State Police Power, 1987
Wis. L. REv. 403.
92 For example, divorce. In 2001, for example, unmarried women with children filed 21.3 bankruptcies
per thousand, compared to 14.7 per thousand for married families with children, 7.2 per thousand for childless
women, and 6.1 per thousand per childless man. Warren, supra note 2, at 26 n.79. If current trends continue,
by the year 2010, one in seven children in the U.S. would live in a home where bankruptcy has been declared.
Id. at 1.
93 See A. Mechele Dickerson, Bankruptcy Reform: Does the End Justify the Means?, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J.
243 (2001) (arguing that bankruptcy should be viewed as part of the non-entitlement federal public assistance
system).
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the actual needs of the individual. Another economic argument in opposition
to the means test is that means testing will limit losses to creditors, which in

turn means that creditors will not pass additional costs on to their future
consumer borrowers. Also, by mandating repayment for those who can afford
it, means testing will eliminate some of the strategic elements that go into the
decision to file for bankruptcy. Debtors should not enjoy marked advantage
over similarly situated nondebtors merely due to the fact that they have chosen
to seek bankruptcy protection while others have not.
The moral arguments against a broad fresh start are consistent with
94
much of history.
religious and historical condemnation of debtors throughout
The argument begins with the contention that the "fresh start" has become a
"head start," an assertion famously made by Justice Harlan dissenting in Lines
v. Frederick.95 The argument is that the fiscally irresponsible are rewarded to
the detriment of the fiscally responsible, creating a serious moral hazard
problem.9 6
97
the continuum.
The broad American fresh start falls at one extreme of
98
In European civil law
Worldwide, many nations allow no discharge at all.
historically been the
has
bankruptcy
a
after
debts
of
payment
the
full
countries,
99
is largely
protection
wage
prospective
of
and the concept
standard,
100
the fresh
1980s,
the
since
that
note
However, the reader should
unknown.
either
countries
start concept has grown in civil law countries, as numerous
for
provide
enacted or modified their consumer bankruptcy legislation to

94
95
96

See Rafael Efrat, The Moral Appeal of Personal Bankruptcy, 20 WHITrIER L. REv. 141 (1998).
See Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 21 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See Lynn M. LoPucki, Common Sense Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 461, 464 (1997)

("Consumer bankruptcy contradicts the morality of Aesop's fable [regarding the grasshopper and the ant].
Today's ants eat beans at home, don't buy the kids new sneakers, and don't try to buy the new house until they
have stable jobs and down payments. They hang onto the jobs, even when the going gets tough, particularly if
the jobs come with health insurance. The grasshoppers eat at the pizza parlor on Friday night and buy the new
sneakers and the houses. They quit their jobs when the going gets tough. The fallout lands on their credit
cards. When winter comes, they discharge the credit card debt in bankruptcy. The ant played by the rules, the
grasshopper didn't. In the end, consumer bankruptcy made them equals.").
97 See generally lain Ramsay, Comparative Consumer Bankruptcy, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 241.
98 See Rafael Efrat, Global Trends in Personal Bankruptcy, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 81 (2002) (discussing
how many nations, including China, Vietnam, Mongolia, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Ukraine, Brazil, Mexico,
Argentina, and Venezuela, allow no debt forgiveness).
99 See Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen, Consumer Bankruptcy in Comparison: Do We Cure a Market Failure
or a Social Problem?, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 473 (1999).
t00 See generally Jason J. Kilbom, The Innovative German Approach to Consumer Debt Relief:
Revolutionary Changes in German Law, and Surprising Lessons for the United States, 24 Nw. J. INT'L. L. &
Bus. 257, 289 (2004).
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consumer debt adjustment. Among the countries that have made such
adjustments to their bankruptcy laws during this period are Denmark, Finland,
Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Germany, and most
recently, the Czech Republic, whose new bankruptcy and insolvency law
became effective on January 1, 2008.1° However, as a general matter, even
where these amendments have occurred in Europe, the respective European
laws differ markedly from their American counterparts in numerous important
ways. These differences tend to include the lack of open access to bankruptcy
in European civil law countries, that payment is generally mandatory for
discharge, and that not only debt counseling but also early negotiations with
creditors tend to be incorporated as an essential part of these processes.,2
One country in which recent amendments have aligned with American
changes that narrow the fresh start is Australia. The 2002 Australian
bankruptcy amendments created new powers for an Official Receiver to reject
a debtor's petition when the petition evidenced certain abuses.' 0 3 In addition,
the prospect of early discharge after six months was removed, adding a
deterrence element to filing in Australia as all Australian debtors now must
remain bankrupt for a full three-year period. 1°4 Another reform consisted of
making objections to discharge easier to uphold. 10 5 By facilitating such
objections, the aim was to try to provide increased incentives for debtor
cooperation in the process. Perhaps as a result, the number of Australian
debtors decreased following
the enactment of the amendments for the first time
16
in nearly a decade.
So what should the fresh start accomplish? To a large extent, its historical
purpose both in the United States and in the United Kingdom, which has been
to serve as a market correction in order to promote entrepreneurial activity,
runs contrary to the policy underlying the Act. In the United States, when the
101 See JOHANNA NIEMI-KIESILAINEN, Collective or Individual? Constructions of Debtors and Creditors
in Consumer Bankruptcy, in CONSUMER BANKRUPrCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECrIVE, supra note 22, at 41, 42

(discussing European consumer insolvency laws).
102 See Niemi-Kiesilainen, supra note 102, at 475.
103 Bankruptcy Legislation Amendment Bill 2002, no. 2002 (Austl.).
104 Id.
105 id.

106 The number of new Australian bankruptcies for the 2003-2004 financial year-20,497-represented a
9.5% decrease in bankruptcies from the prior fiscal year, and is the lowest number of bankruptcy filings in
Australia since the 1995-1996 fiscal year. See Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia, Quarterly
Bankruptcy Statistics-Provisional Bankruptcy Statistics-Parts IV and XI, http://www.itsa.gov.au (follow
"About Us" hyperlink; then follow "Statistics" hyperlink; then follow "Overview of Quarterly Statistics"
hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
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new American bankruptcy law was drafted in the 1970s, the focus was on
market regulation. Consumer bankruptcy was seen as a market function, with
bankruptcy providing a necessary complement to open access to the credit
The Bankruptcy Laws Commission, in its Report of the
market. 10 7
Commission of the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, noted the beneficial
aspects of the use of credit and of entrepreneurial risk taking, and argued that8
associated risk.
the presence of bankruptcy law serve to offset some of the
As a result, legislators in the United States decided to encourage individuals to
be economically active. The breadth of the American fresh start provides a
social safety net for those who put money into the American economy. Thus,
09
market efficiency'
American bankruptcy law was designed to help promote
of mandatory, immutable insurance for all
by, in effect, creating a form
0
individual credit contracts."
Recent bankruptcy reform in the United Kingdom has taken a policy
opposite to that underlying the Act and more in conformity with historic
Anglo-American consumer bankruptcy policy."' Accordingly, it has been
motivated to a large degree by concern over the degree of stigma associated
with bankruptcy, with the worry that this stigma has prevented honest
individuals from taking rational risks in the conduct of their business affairs.
The Enterprise Act' 12 was enacted in 2002 in part to encourage entrepreneurial
activity in the United Kingdom. A primary goal of the Act is to reduce the
stigma of bankruptcy by giving entrepreneurs a second chance if they have
failed through no fault of their own.'1 3 The Act's intent was to accomplish this
through a number of changes to the Insolvency Act of 1986, most notably a
change in the duration of the period of bankruptcy. The Enterprise Act
amended Section 279 of the Insolvency Act. The section previously provided
for either a two-year period of bankruptcy in which a certificate for summary
administration of the debtor's estate was issued and was not revoked before the
107 See Bankruptcy Laws Commission in Report of the Commission of the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States, H.R. Doc. No. 93-173, at 71-76 (1973).

108 Id.
109 See Michelle J. White, Economic Versus Sociological Approaches to Legal Research: The Case of
Bankruptcy, 25 L. & Soc'Y REv. 685 (199 1); Doug Rendelman, The Bankruptcy Discharge: Toward a Fresher

Start, 58 N.C. L. REV. 723 (1980).
110 See Barry Adler, Ben Polak & Alan Schwartz, Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A Theoretical
Inquiry, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (2000).
111 See generally Donna McKenzie Skene & Adrian Waiters, Consumer Bankruptcy Law Reform in Great
Britain, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 477 (2006) (discussing consumer bankruptcy reform in the United Kingdom).

112 Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40, § 10 (Eng.).
113 Id.
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debtor's discharge, and a three-year period in all other cases.'l 4 Under the new
law, the norm for honest and non-reckless debtors is a release from bankruptcy
restrictions after twelve months (or shorter if the official receiver files a notice
stating that investigation of the debtor's conduct is not needed). 115 As a
corollary provision, reckless and culpable debtors will be forced to comply
with Bankruptcy Restrictions Orders for a period up to fifteen years." 6 Under
Schedule 4A, contained in Schedule 20 of the Enterprise Bill, a myriad of
factors can enter into a court's determination that a Bankruptcy Restrictions
Order is appropriate, including whether the debtor has failed to keep and
provide records, entered into a fraudulent transfer, given a preference, or
incurred a debt prior to bankruptcy that was beyond the debtor's ability to
117
pay.
CONCLUSION

Early statistical data supports the conclusion that the Act, at least initially,
has succeeded in altering the ratio of chapter 7 and chapter 13 filings and
impacting the rate of bankruptcy filings. Such a result is fully consistent with
the model of rational bankruptcy. As we become further removed from the
implementation of the Act, a number of factors will change. Debtors will no
longer be able to time their bankruptcy filings to take advantage of pre-Act
law, and interest rates and credit availability will fluctuate. When these
changes occur, it will be interesting to see if the initial filing patterns continue
on a long term basis.

114
115
116
117

Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 279 (Eng.).
Id. § 256 (amending the Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 279 (Eng)).

id.

Id. § 257 (amending the Insolvency Act, § 279).

